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In a federation of states, such as the United States, individual states
agree to relinquish a degree of control over their own affairs to the fed-
eral government for the common good of the republic. However, this
pact between the states and the federal government is often an uneasy
one. When the terms of the pact dictate that a federal law must invali-
date a state law, the state government invariably resents the intrusion
into its affairs. A recent example of this tug-of-war is the rash of litiga-
tion involving enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
(PDAA's) in brokers' contracts. These agreements are meant to force
arbitration as the means of settling disputes between broker and cus-
tomer over the handling of margin accounts.' PDAA's are themselves
resonant of another tug-of-war, that between the wish to protect inves-
tors' rights and the wish to relieve the pressure on overly crowded
courts.2 Federal policy requires upholding PDAA's since enactment of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925. 3 Nevertheless, since then,
over 30 states, distrustful of PDAA's and chafing at their constitutional
subordination to the federal government, have attempted to regulate and
significantly weaken such agreements through laws at the state level.4
The most notable judicial result of this clash to date is the decision in
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, where the court struck down a set
of Massachusetts regulations seeking to weaken PDAA's.5 This paper
will examine the history of challenges to the FAA and the current status
of the conflict between the FAA and various state laws over PDAA's in
the securities industry, with particular attention to the Connolly decision.
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Bentley College.
I. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 277 (1982).
2. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommoda-
tions of Conflicting Public Policy, 64 N.C.L. REV. 219, 224-25 (1986).
3. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-14, 43 Stat. 833-86 (1925) (current revision at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
4. The Boston Globe, Jan. 28, 1990, at 77, col. 4.
5. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
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II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The nature of the tension between federal and state governments over
arbitration agreements is best illuminated by reviewing the purpose of
the FAA's support of PDAA's. When Congress enacted the FAA in
1925, it was attempting to solve the problems of overcrowded courts by
declaring a national policy favoring arbitration of some disputes rather
than resort to judicial forum for resolution of all conflicts.6 Thus, section
two of the FAA declares that in a maritime transaction or a contract
involving commerce "an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract ...shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract."7 This act gives courts the power
to compel arbitration in accordance with a written agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising from a given contract.
In the securities industry, where the liability exposure is significant,
the FAA became the statutory underpinning for an industry-wide policy
of incorporating PDAA's into customer agreements as a non-negotiable
condition of opening a margin account.8 Thus, brokers used the FAA to
effectively make arbitration the method of resolving disputes over securi-
ties fraud. The securities industry enthusiastically embraced the oppor-
tunity to resolve claims through arbitration because arbitration costs less
than defending against a customer's claim in court and because arbitral
forums, closely linked to the securities industry, give brokers more con-
trol over the resolution of claims than does the judicial forum.9
What was the congressional intent in handing brokers and other par-
ties to contracts such an effective tool for encouraging arbitration over
court suits? In passing the FAA, Congress was forcing abandonment of
a long-held suspicion of arbitration by the federal and state courts.' 0
Historically, the courts have been loathe to honor arbitration agreements
because, at heart, these agreements circumvent the normal checks to
abuse present in the judicial system. This judicial distrust of arbitration
is best evidenced in the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan,
where the court declined to compel arbitration of a securities fraud
case.11 Here, the Court objected to arbitration for the following reasons:
6. Note, Arbitraribility of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137,
1141 (1986).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-122 (1924).
8. See The Boston Globe, supra note 4. See generally Reder, Securities Law And Arbitration:
The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker Customer Agreements, 1990 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 91 (1990) (discussing history and changes in securities arbitration made by Congress,
courts and regulatory agencies).
9. Id.
10. Note, supra note 6, at 1137, 1141.
11. 346 U.S. 427 (1953)(overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
1. arbitration must make legal determinations without judicial in-
struction on the law;
2. arbitration awards may be made without explanation and without
a complete record of proceedings;
3. the power to vacate an award is limited; and
4. arbitration awards are not subject to judicial review for errors in
interpretation.1 2
The fact that the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilko was handed down
decades after the enactment of the FAA clearly illustrates that this fed-
eral statute did not do away with a distrust that arbitration could fairly
resolve claims of securities fraud. Rather, this distrust grew, fomented
perhaps by the presence of such abuses of customer trust as churning,
material misrepresentation of facts, conspiracy, and mail and wire fraud,
all of which involve securities industry personnel making decisions about
customer accounts on the basis of their own monetary interests rather
than those of the customer. Moreover, this distrust surfaced in Wilko
and in many other individual suits in the form of skirmishing over
whether individual PDAA's were actually within the purview of the
FAA.
These various skirmishes generally involve the claim that a particular
PDAA is invalid, the federal policy supporting arbitration notwithstand-
ing. Under the FAA, there are only two ways to invalidate an existing
PDAA. First, if an agreement is entered into in a way which violates
common contract law, that is through fraud, mistake, duress, undue in-
fluence, or illegality, the PDAA is invalid. I3 Indeed, some investors have
sought release from PDAA's on the grounds that these agreements vio-
late contract law.' 4 Second, if the congressional mandate of the FAA is
contravened by another congressional mandate which can be proven to
govern the PDAA in question, the agreement is invalid even if there was
no breach of contract law. 5 In fact, most suits attempting to invalidate
PDAA's have claimed that the PDAA in question fell under the purview
of another federal statute which prohibited relinquishment of the right to
judicial redress. 6 Such suits also claim, in a related argument, that en-
forcement of arbitration in a particular case would undermine the pri-
mary purpose of a contravening federal statute. 7
12. Id. at 436-37.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-122 (1924).
14. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
15. 346 U.S. at 427.
16. Id. at 432-33.
17. Id. at 438.
1992]
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III. THE SECURITIES ACT, THE EXCHANGE ACT AND RICO
As happens, shortly after Congress enacted the FAA, this body en-
acted two other statutes whose primary purpose was to protect investors
from securities fraud, the alleged offense in most investor attempts to
avoid enforcement of PDAA's. Not surprisingly, these two statutes, the
Securities Act of 193318 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,19 be-
came the rationale used by many victims of securities fraud who wished
to bring suit in court rather than be bound by PDAA's which they had
signed. Such investors claimed that their PDAA's were covered by the
federal securities statutes and that these statutes represented congres-
sional commands which contravened the congressional command of the
FAA.20 In addition, a more recent federal statute, the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) section of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970,21 has also been claimed by disgruntled par-
ties to PDAA's as a basis for contravening the FAA's command to up-
hold the agreements. Although intended by Congress as a weapon
against organized crime, RICO has also become a commonly used
weapon against securities fraud.22 The basis for claiming that these fed-
eral statutes represent congressional commands which counter and su-
persede the FAA's command to arbitrate is that all three statutes allow
allegedly defrauded investors access to the courts for redress of their
grievances.23
Needless to say, there were many attempts to seek judicial redress
under the two securities statutes and under RICO. Such attempts fo-
cused on the following two facts: arbitration agreements are often buried
in the fine print of a customer's contract and customers are often coerced
into signing them as a precondition of opening an account with a firm.24
These two facts led to the claim that PDAA's are in violation of Section
14 of the Securities Act, which states that "[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this subchapter ... shall be void."25 Since
Section 29(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act is essentially the same as Section
14 of the Securities Act, investors also claimed PDAA's to be in violation
of the Exchange Act.26 In the investors' view, two of the provisions of
the securities acts which cannot be waived are the right of an investor to
18. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq. (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq. (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
20. 346 U.S. at 427.
21. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
22. Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 1, & AS, col. 1.
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988); 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(2) (West 1981 & Supp.
1988); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
24. See The Boston Globe, supra note 4.
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77n (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78cc(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
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1 ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
full disclosure of material information and a "special right" to recover
for misrepresentations and to proceed against the issuer in federal
court.27 Thus, interpreting these two sections in concert, investors ar-
gued that Section 14 of the Securities Act and Section 29(a) of the Ex-
change Act, both congressional mandates, preempted Section 2 of the
FAA.2" Thus, plaintiffs claimed that the mandate of the federal securi-
ties statutes for protection of investors' rights through clear and honest
information contravened the mandate of the FAA for prompt, economi-
cal and adequate solution of controversies through arbitration.29
Disgruntled investors who bring suits to invalidate PDAA's under
RICO are able to do so because RICO's broad wording lists "securities
fraud" as one of a multitude of possible "racketeering" acts. Since this
statute does not require that such "racketeering" acts be linked to organ-
ized crime to fall within its purview, this apparent misuse is understanda-
ble.30 The particular appeal of the RICO statute is that, unlike the two
securities statutes, RICO offers investors the possibility of recovering
treble damages, allows the use of civil discovery and permits plaintiffs to
prove allegations by only a "preponderance of evidence."'"
IV. ELIMINATING THE CONTRAVENTION ARGUMENT
At present, however, investors can no longer claim the Securities Act,
the Exchange Act or RICO as avenues for forcing invalidation of
PDAA's. Two cases have settled the law on this point by establishing
that the FAA's mandate to uphold PDAA's can be honored without
damage to the fabric of these other three statutes. The first of these two
cases, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 2 dealt with claims
under the 1934 Exchange Act and under RICO. The second, Rodriguez
De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Brothers, settled the issue of claims under
the 1933 Securities Act.a3
In McMahon, the district court and appeals court took opposite sides
on the issue of the FAA versus the Exchange Act and RICO. The facts
of the case involved losses sustained by Eugene and Julia McMahon in an
account they had with Shearson/American Express, which was serviced
by one of their registered representatives, Mary Ann McNulty. The
McMahons claimed that the losses were caused by McNulty, that her
actions constituted fraud and, thus, were a violation both of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and of RICO. Even though Julia McMahon had
27. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
28. Id. at 228.
29. 346 U.S. at 438.
30. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
31. Id.
32. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
33. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
1992]
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signed a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate any claims relative to this
account, the McMahons attempted to litigate their claim in district
court. At this point, McNulty and Shearson/American Express moved
to compel arbitration in accord with the arbitration agreement signed by
McMahon, citing Section 3 of the FAA to support their motion.34
The district court agreed with Shearson that the federal policy, articu-
lated in the FAA, of upholding PDAA's was germane to this case and
that claims under 10(b) of the Exchange Act were arbitrable without
damage to the intent of the Exchange Act, the protection of investors'
rights, but held that the RICO claims were not arbitrable.35 However,
when the case was appealed, the court of appeals, while agreeing with the
district court on RICO claims, reversed on the Exchange Act and, citing
Wilko's holding that Securities Act claims were exempt from the FAA,
held that in this case the public policy for special protection of investors'
rights took precedence over the public policy favoring arbitration.36
Thus, the appeals court held that claims under the Exchange Act were
immune from the FAA's mandate to arbitrate.
To resolve these contradicting interpretations of congressional intent
evidenced by the lower courts, the Supreme Court heard the McMahon
case in 1986. 37 Agreeing with the district court, the Supreme Court held
that nothing in the Exchange Act forbids enforcement of PDAA's.
38
The Court addressed the previously discussed Wilko argument cited by
the appeals court. This argument held that to waive the right to a judi-
cial forum would be to prevent compliance with the terms of the Securi-
ties Act, an action expressly forbidden by the statute. In examining this
argument in McMahon, however, the Court held that the judicial forum
provided in Section 27 of the Exchange Act could be waived without
violating Section 29(a) which prohibits any practice preventing compli-
ance with its provisions. Thus, the high court did not view resort to
judicial redress as a form of substantive compliance with the Exchange
Act but rather as a jurisdictional option and so held that claims under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are still subject to the command of the
FAA to uphold arbitration agreements. 39 Likewise, the Court held that
nothing in the text or legislative history of RICO suggests that civil
claims under this statute cannot be submitted to an arbitral forum.4'
Clearly, the McMahon decision made it impossible for potential litigants
34. 482 U.S. at 222-24.
35. Id. at 224.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id. at 238.
39. Id. at 227.
40. Id. at 238.
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to claim that signed arbitration agreements are unenforceable under
either the Exchange Act or RICO.
What, then, remained to completely preclude the possibility of voiding
the command of the FAA by citing a contravening federal statute was a
formal extension of the Supreme Court's reasoning in McMahon to the
1933 Securities Act. This occurred in the second case to be examined
here, Rodriguez De Quias v. Shearson/Lehman Brothers.4" In Rodri-
guez, a group of individual investors claimed that they suffered financial
losses at the hands of a Shearson agent who engaged in unauthorized
fraudulent transactions in their account. As in McMahon, although each
appellee had signed a PDAA as part of a customer agreement, the appel-
lees attempted to bring suit against their agent and Shearson in district
court. Again, as in McMahon, Shearson moved to compel the honoring
of the signed arbitration agreements, as mandated by the FAA.42
The litigants in Rodriguez made claims under various state laws as
well as under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and RICO. The dis-
trict court ordered arbitration on all but the federal securities claims.43
When Rodriguez was brought to the court of appeals, however, this court
reversed the district court, holding that the federal securities claims were
also subject to arbitration.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
upheld the appeals court ruling.45 Citing McMahon, the Court pointed
out that not only were the Exchange Act and RICO claims clearly arbi-
trable, but that Securities Act claims were arbitrable as well. In so hold-
ing, the Supreme Court stated that, because the relevant provisions for
judicial redress and prohibition of practices leading to non-compliance
were virtually identical in both securities acts, the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in McMahon had to be extended to the Securities Act as
well.46 Here, the Court formally overruled Wilko's decision that claims
under the Securities Act were immune from the FAA.47 The Court
further pointed out that, as in McMahon, their ruling in Rodriguez rested
on a belief in the adequacy of arbitration to resolve securities disputes,
making clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
oversight authority, considerably broadened since Wilko, was clearly ad-
equate for this task.48 Thus, both the McMahon and the Rodriguez
courts held that investors' rights would not be compromised in arbitral
41. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).




46. Id. at 482.
47. Id. at 484.
48. Id. at 483.
19921
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forums, and, therefore, use of such forums would not undermine the pur-
pose of the Securities Act or of the Exchange Act.
V. AFrER MCMAHON
In view of McMahon and Rodriguez, it appears that the law is estab-
lished with regard to upholding PDAA's under both securities acts and
under RICO. Interestingly, when faced with an indisputable, unambigu-
ous federal policy for support of arbitration agreements, various federal
entities took action to make the arbitration process fairer. These reme-
dial actions gave cognizance to the following common consumer com-
plaints: that investors were often not aware of the existence or
consequences of PDAA's in customer agreements, that forcing investors
to sign such agreements as a precondition to opening an account was a
coercive use of economic power and that arbitration boards were often
stacked in the brokers' favor.4 9 Thus, the SEC promulgated a rule that
forced brokers to highlight the existence of PDAA's and their implica-
tions for investors.50 Again, although the SEC did not forbid mandatory
PDAA's, it did urge the securities industry to find ways to make such
agreements voluntary.5 ' Likewise, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), another congressionally created entity, promul-
gated rules similar to those set forth by the SEC.5 2 In both of these cases,
rules limiting PDAA's could be promulgated without fear of running
afoul of the FAA because the rules issue from federal entities created by
Congress. Further, Representative Markey (D-MA) has announced
plans to introduce legislation in Congress to ban mandatory arbitration
agreements and make arbitration forums more like court proceedings.5 3
Were Congress itself to pass such legislation, it would obviously not pre-
empt itself, for, the mandate of the FAA would be contravened by the
new statute.
Needless to say, this discomfort with conclusive entrenchment of the
federal mandate to substitute arbitration for judicial redress of securities
fraud claims was not limited to individual investors and federal entities.
As stated earlier, many states were also uncomfortable with the federal
mandate for arbitration. However, the power of the states to circumvent
the FAA with laws of their own was severely circumscribed by the
supremacy clause in the federal constitution which declares that, in the
case of a conflict, a federal law always preempts a state law. Thus,
although Congress, in the two securities laws discussed earlier, granted
49. The Boston Globe, Jan. 28, 1990, at 80, col. 4.
50. Id.
51. The Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1990 at 59, col. 1 & 2.
52. 7 U.S.C. 7a(l1), 12a (Supp. V, 1975).
53. See The Boston Globe, supra note 51.
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the states concurrent power to regulate their own securities industries,5 4
this power could only be used within the parameters defined by federal
statutes.
In fact, all states have securities acts, commonly referred to as "blue
sky laws." While varying widely in terms and scope, all of these securi-
ties laws offer the same judicial remedies afforded by the federal securi-
ties laws. Again, every state has implemented regulations for their
securities acts which delineate further state powers over the securities
industry. Historically, this vast body of state statutes and regulations,
generally based upon the Uniform Securities Act,5" echoed the essence of
the federal securities laws. The tension between these two sets of laws
was activated only when the states wished to contradict or go beyond
federal securities policy. Such is the case with the issue of PDAA's. As
the federal mandate for arbitration was solidified, dissatisfaction with
this policy was growing at the state level, exacerbated by the stock mar-
ket crash in 1987 and the perceived prevalence of consumer rights viola-
tions.5 6 In response to this conflict, many states began to examine the
possibility of controlling and limiting the use of PDAA's within their
borders. However, given the statutory structure outlined here, these ef-
forts to make PDAA's fairer are less likely to succeed at the state level
than were the efforts by the SEC and the CFTC at the federal level.
What would happen then, when a state inevitably challenged this fed-
erally weighted balance of power by attempting to use its congressionally
granted concurrent power to lessen the impact of the FAA? The best
answer to this question, to date, is found in an analysis of Securities In-
dustry Ass'n v. Connolly."
VI. THE CONNOLLY DECISION: STATE V. FEDERAL STANDARDS
The Connolly case was precipitated when the Massachusetts Secretary
of State's office became concerned with what it saw as abuses of Massa-
chusetts investors' rights through mandatory PDAA's. 51 To remedy this
situation, Secretary of State Connolly, using his concurrent powers of
regulation, issued regulations meant to curb these abuses. These regula-
tions prohibited brokers from requiring PDAA's as "a nonnegotiable
condition precedent to account relationships" and simultaneously en-
joined these brokers to fully disclose both the voluntary nature of arbitra-
tion agreements and their full legal consequences.59 In essence, these
54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r, 78bb (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
55. See UNIFORM SECUarrIEs ACT § 101-419, 7B U.S.C.A. 509 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
56. See The Boston Globe, supra note 51.
57. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
58. The Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1990, at 57, col. 5.
59. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950 § 12.204 (1986).
19921
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regulations issued an alarming "caveat emptor" to investors. Once
promulgated, the Massachusetts regulations were immediately chal-
lenged by a consortium of brokerage firms doing business in Massachu-
setts. Predictably, these securities dealers contended that Massachusetts
regulations were preempted by the FAA.'"
Upon hearing Connolly, the U.S. District Court sided with the brokers,
holding that the Massachusetts regulations were indeed preempted by
the FAA. 61 Judge Woodlock ruled that the FAA requires that arbitra-
tion agreements be treated no differently than contracts in general. Since
the Massachusetts regulations "went to the heart of the process-of form-
ing contracts to arbitrate," these regulations singled out arbitration con-
tracts for more rigorous regulation than imposed on other contracts in
Massachusetts.62
When Massachusetts appealed the district court's decision, the appeals
court essentially reached an identical conclusion as did Judge Woodlock,
upholding the district court's decision and finding for the brokers.63
Since the Supreme Court has recently refused to hear this case, 6 a close
look at the reasoning of the appeals court should shed significant light on
the limits of a state's ability to regulate PDAA's in the manner attempted
by Massachusetts.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in presenting its argument to
the Court of Appeals, claimed that the power granted it by Congress to
concurrently regulate its own securities industry could be used to issue
the regulations in questions.65 Massachusetts further contended that its
regulations did not treat arbitration agreements any differently than
other contracts between businesses and consumers. Rather, lawyers for
the state argued that the Commonwealth was regulating these arbitration
agreements exactly as it regulated all contracts, using the public welfare
as indicator of necessary regulation.66
The appeals court disagreed with the Commonwealth on both points,
finding that the permission granted to the states by Congress to concur-
rently regulate the securities industry did not exempt states from the pre-
emption effect of the FAA with respect to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.67 Again, the court held the Commonwealth's assertion that
it was treating PDAA's like all other contracts to be specious. In fact, its
finding that Massachusetts was singling out PDAA's for more stringent
60. The Boston Globe, Jan. 28, 1990, at 80, col. 1.
61. 703 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Mass. 1988).
62. Id.
63. 883 F.2d at 1114.
64. Id.; See Wall St. J., May 30, 1990, at B8, col. 1.
65. 883 F.2d at 1114.
66. Id. at 1120.
67. Id. at 1121-22.
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regulation than other contracts formed the heart of the appeals court's
holding.6"
In this context, the court found that the Massachusetts regulations did
indeed treat standard-form PDAA's in the securities industry more se-
verely than other standard-form contracts in Massachusetts. 69 In so do-
ing, the regulations actually conflicted with the national policy favoring
arbitration, as it was articulated in the FAA. For, the FAA mandates
that arbitration agreements be enforceable except where they are voided
by the principles of common contract law.70 In issuing these regulations,
Massachusetts sought to provide more inclusive grounds for voiding
PDAA's than were provided for other contracts in the Commonwealth.
While it might be argued that the Massachusetts regulations do generally
address the contract law grounds for nullification of contracts, fraud or
coercive economic power, they articulate these grounds in a more specific
way than is done for other Massachusetts contracts. Further, the specific
way in which the regulations set forth the voluntary conditions and dis-
closure are patently hostile to the policy of arbitration.
Indeed, the appeals court implied that, not only is Massachusetts en-
joined from treating arbitration contracts more harshly than it treated
other contracts, but the state actually has a duty to treat such contracts
more favorably. Thus, the court held that, because the FAA mandates
the encouragement of arbitration agreements, no state may simply sub-
ject arbitration to individuated regulation in the same way as it might
subject some other unprotected contractual device. Here, the court im-
plied that the state actually has less regulatory authority over PDAA's
than it has over other contracts, especially if the regulatory authority
would be used to discourage rather than encourage the use of PDAA's.71
In this context, the court pointed out that other courts had previously
struck down two state regulations, requiring, respectively, that PDAA's
be highlighted in 10-point type and that all PDAA's be signed by an
attorney who attests that investors have been fully informed of the effects
of the agreement.72
In mandating that state regulations be friendly to arbitration agree-
ments, the court pointed out that the language of the FAA is unambigu-
ous, clearly carving out a broad sphere of influence for its dictates.73
Here, the appeals court followed the Supreme Court's finding in South-
land Corp. v. Keating, that Congress intended the dictates of the FAA to
68. Id. at 1120.
69. Id. at 1124.
70. Id. at 1120.
71. Id.
72. Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1986); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-
Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1972).
73. 883 F.2d at 1124.
1992]
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encompass not just actions in federal courts but also actions in state
courts.7 ' Southland also holds unequivocally that, in passing the FAA,
Congress intended to foreclose state efforts to prevent arbitration.75
Again, in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the appeals court reaf-
firmed the FAA's reach over claims made under state laws, asserting that
the FAA requires that, when signed arbitration agreements exist, such
claims must be submitted to arbitration, even if a concurrent federal
claim is pending.76
In light of the clear and sweeping language of the FAA, the Connolly
court held that congressional intent in passing this law was unquestiona-
bly to encourage arbitration.77 Thus, in evaluating the legality of any
state regulations, the measure must be whether or not they "disturb too
much the congressionally declared scheme" of legitimizing the arbitral
solution. 71 If state regulations act as an obstacle to the ends which Con-
gress set out to achieve in the FAA, then the regulations may not stand.
In Connolly, the court found that the Massachusetts regulations, which
obviously emphasized the drawbacks to signing PDAA's, did indeed al-
ter measurably the FAA's scheme by blocking its desired result, a cli-
mate favorable to arbitration agreements.79
In striking down the Massachusetts regulations considered in Con-
nolly, then, the court made clear that it was not voiding all state regula-
tions relating to PDAA's, but only those regulations which were inimical
to arbitration. Massachusetts, the court asserted, was free to regulate
PDAA's as long as it did so in a manner consistent with its regulation of
other contracts under general contract law."0 While affirming the cir-
cumscribed rights of the states in this area, however, the Connolly court
also emphasized that the states did not possess the same latitude in issu-
ing regulations which impinged on the purview of the FAA as did the
SEC and CFTC in their previously discussed rules.8
VII. UNACCEPTABLE STATE LEGISLATION
What types of state regulation of PDAA's can be expected to stand the
test of judicial scrutiny? Relying on precedent set in the cases discussed
earlier, particularly Southland, McMahon and Connolly, some broad con-
clusions can be drawn. In general, the bench marks to be applied to such
a state law are whether the law conflicts with the purposes of the FAA
74. 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1983).
75. Id. at 16.
76. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
77. 883 F.2d at 1119.
78. 883 F.2d. at 1118 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1120.
81. Id. at 1122.
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and whether the law singles out arbitration contracts to be treated more
severely than other contracts. In this context, a series of cases have been
brought where investors have sought to nullify signed arbitration agree-
ments on the grounds that they are prohibited by a state securities act.
Thus, suits have been brought under state securities acts in Kansas,82
Pennsylvania,83 Washington, 4 and Connecticut.8 5 In general, these state
securities laws were modeled on the Uniform Securities Act 6 and con-
tained a non-waiver of substantive rights provision, essentially identical
to provisions 14 and 29(a) of the 193387 and 193488 federal securities
acts. Predictably, in these cases, the courts struck down the state laws on
grounds identical to those spelled out for the federal laws in McMahon
and Rodriguez; namely,that the non-waiver clause referred to substantive
rights under these state securities laws rather than jurisdictional rights.
Further, the judges noted that even if these non-waiver clauses were con-
strued by the states in question to include jurisdictional rights, as was the
case in Osterneck concerning the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972,89
they would be preempted by the FAA on the grounds explicated in Con-
nolly where state securities laws impeded actualization of the goal of the
FAA and so were preempted.' In Russolillo, the court, citing Kroog,
reiterated that "a naked and irreconcilable conflict between the precise
federal mandate to arbitration and a state provision which prevents arbi-
tration" must be resolved through preemption of the state statute by the
FAA.9 ' Citing Southland, the Reed court repeated that the FAA had
withdrawn the power of the state to require a judicial forum for settle-
ment of securities claims.92 The Osterneck court, again citing Southland,
made clear that the likelihood of state securities laws prevailing in the
contexts mentioned here was slim. The relevant ruling in Osterneck held
that, through the FAA, Congress "intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut enforceability of arbitration agreements.93" In
summary, the litigation to date makes clear that any state statute ex-
pressly or implicitly forbidding arbitration agreements will not stand the
test of judicial scrutiny.
82. Reed v. Bear, Steams & Co., 698 F. Supp. 835 (D. Kan. 1988).
83. Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508 (3rd Cir. 1988).
84. West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
85. Russolillo v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1988).
86. See 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 561-708 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ccc (West 1981 & Supp. 1988).
89. 841 F.2d at 511.
90. Id. at 512-13.
91. 694 F. Supp. at 1042.
92. 698 F. Supp. at 839.
93. 841 F.2d at 511 (3rd Cir. 1988)(quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 16).
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VIII. ACCEPTABLE STATE LEGISLATION
However, there have been a few cases where state securities statutes
were upheld in court. In each of these cases, the statutes survived be-
cause they met the two tests for avoiding preemption. That is, these stat-
utes did not impede implementation of the FAA's goals nor did they
treat arbitration contracts any differently than other contracts.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court ruled in Volt Information Sci-
ence, Inc v. Board of Trustees that arbitration agreements which incorpo-
rate state laws hospitable to arbitration are enforceable as written.94
Thus, in accordance with the California Franchise Investment Act, the
Court in Volt held that arbitration could be stayed pending resolution of
related litigation involving third parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement. Here, the Court upheld the reach of the state statute because
it was incorporated into the signed arbitration agreement.95 The Court
pointed out in Volt that the FAA does not confer any absolute right to
compel arbitration, but only the right to compel arbitration in accord-
ance with the terms of a signed agreement.96 Again, the Court was care-
ful to point out here that the agreement was allowed to stand only
because the California law in question did not operate to block the pur-
poses of the FAA.97
Again, in New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co.,98
(NEEI), the appeals court reversed the Massachusetts district court to
uphold the reach of the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act99 over
an arbitration agreement."°° The issue here was whether claims could be
consolidated for the purposes of arbitration even though the arbitration
agreement made no mention of a right to consolidate. The Massachu-
setts statute in question would allow such consolidation in NEEI, since it
was factually appropriate to consolidate the claims in question. The
court ruled that, since the Massachusetts statute did not speak to the
right to choose arbitration over litigation and did not run counter to the
federal mandate for favoring arbitration, the statute could appropriately
be applied to the arbitration agreement in question.°" The court further
pointed out that, in Massachusetts, consent is not required to order con-
solidation of any contract, so that ordering consolidation without con-
sent in this case would not single out arbitration agreements for
94. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
95. Id. at 468.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 469.
98. 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).
99. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251 § 2A (West 1988).
100. 855 F.2d at 2-3.
101. Id. at 4-5.
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singularly severe treatment. 102 Again, the court's findings here are con-
sistent with the judicial rulings examined earlier.
While the Virginia District Court ruling in Saturn Distribution Corp. v.
Williams"°3 articulated the same principles for upholding state laws
found in Volt and NEEI,'° it partially contradicted the finding in Con-
nolly.'05 The state statute in question here is the Virginia Motor Vehicle
Dealer Licensing Act which precludes mandatory arbitration clauses
from incorporation in franchise agreements between automobile manu-
facturers and dealers. " In holding that this preclusion was not pre-
empted by the FAA, the Virginia court, citing Volt, found that
"arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion." 10 7
Thus, the court reasoned that the Virginia law did not conflict with the
FAA because it did not prohibit arbitration agreements summarily but
only required that such agreements be voluntary.1
0 8
The district court decision in Saturn appears to partially contradict the
finding in Connolly that the Massachusetts regulations insisting on volun-
tary and informed consent to PDAA's were preempted by the FAA. Ad-
dressing this apparent contradiction, the Virginia court pointed out that,
while the Massachusetts regulations were found to single out arbitration
agreements for treatment different than that given to other contracts,
such was not the case with the Virginia statute. In fact, the Saturn court
pointed out that arbitration contracts were actually being treated more
favorably than were other contracts between supplier and dealer under
this statute. These other prescriptive sections of the Virginia statute can-
not be violated while preclusion of arbitration agreements can be waived
by informed consent."°9 Again, while the court agreed that the state of
Virginia should not avoid its duty to enforce section 2 of the arbitration
act by banning formation of arbitration agreements, it emphasized that
the statute in question regulated arbitration agreements as part of an
overall program of regulation of potentially adhesive contracts, rather
than in a manner solely prejudicial to arbitration contracts. 01
The Virginia court ended its opinion by commenting on what it con-
sidered an error in judicial judgment in the Connolly decision. In reach-
ing its conclusion that arbitration contracts in Saturn were treated
similarly to other Virginia contracts, the court relied on a body of law
102. Id. at 5-6.
103. 717 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Va. 1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 516 (1990).
104. Id. at 1150.
105. Id. at 1152.
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46 1-550.5:27 (1989 Supp.).
107. 717 F. Supp. at 1151 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
108. Id.
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which included all statutory and common law governing contracts in
Virginia. On the other hand, the Connolly court determined the Massa-
chusetts regulations singled out arbitration agreements unfairly by sur-
veying only the state's common law, unenhanced by statutory law. The
district court in Saturn contended that, had the Connolly court included
statutory law in its analysis, it might have reached the conclusion that
the Massachusetts regulations did not treat arbitration agreements differ-
ently than other contracts, but rather emphasized informed consent as
rule. For, citing the district court finding in Connolly, the Saturn court
pointed out that "Massachusetts law does contain a variety of idiosyn-
cratic statutory provisions which require special treatment of-and dis-
closure regarding-certain types of contractual provisions.""' While
the Connolly court dismissed these statutory provisions as "the excep-
tions that prove the rule,""' 2 the Virginia court believed that considera-
tion of these statutory provisions might indicate that Massachusetts was
not really singling out arbitration contacts for treatment different than
that given other contracts." 3
When the Saturn Corporation appealed the district court's decision,
however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court and essentially
echoed the reasoning of the Connolly court.' 4 The appeals court found
that to disallow in a contract the inclusion of the provision that arbitra-
tion be the mandatory forum for settling disputes arising from that con-
tract is to treat arbitration contracts more harshly than other
contracts."' To buttress this conclusion, the fourth circuit alluded to the
fact that general Virginia contract law does not prohibit non-negotiable
clauses in contracts, nor does it look disapprovingly on contracts of ad-
hesion.' 6 In explaining its finding, the circuit court rejected Virginia's
defense of its statute's prohibition on non-consensual arbitration clauses,
declaring that even limitations on future mandatory agreements would
frustrate the federal policy favoring arbitration. Here, the fourth circuit
refused to recognize Virginia's attempted distinction between existing
agreements and the formation of future agreements and the distinction
between banning all arbitration agreements and banning only agreements
which are mandated in non-negotiable standardized contracts." 7
Interestingly, while the fourth circuit's majority opinion in Saturn
echoed the Connolly decision, the dissent not only echoed the Virginia
district court but also voiced all the concerns which led the state of Mas-
111. Id. at 1152.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 725.
116. Id. at 725-26.
117. Id. at 723.
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sachusetts to attempt to regulate non-negotiable arbitration agreements.
The dissent explicitly disagreed with the Connolly court."' In essence,
the fourth circuit's dissenting opinion distills the argument against
mandatory PDAA's when it reiterates the Volt court's assertion that the
VAA contains no express pre-emptive provision nor any indication that
Congress intended to occupy the whole field of arbitration." 9 The dis-
sent further points out that prohibition of mandatory arbitration agree-
ments is not in direct conflict with the FAA since such prohibition does
not preclude consensual arbitration agreements.'12  Perhaps, the argu-
ment advanced here is that the FAA, while attempting to insulate arbi-
tration agreements from entrenched judicial hostility, was not intended
to replace judicial hostility toward arbitration with judicial advocacy of
arbitration. Indeed, the dissent feels constrained to remind interested
parties that the purpose of the judicial system is "to do justice between
man and man and citizen and sovereign, not to keep our dockets clear. 12 1
Here, the dissent questions whether the FAA's goal of reducing conges-
tion in the courts by encouraging arbitration should displace the more
fundamental duty of a government to protect the rights of its citizens.
IX. CONCLUSION
Both the Connolly court and the Saturn court were concerned with the
validity of state laws governing the formation of arbitration agreements.
As such, they stand differentiated from most of the cases considered here
which seek enforcement of existing arbitration agreements rather than
preclusion of future ones. Because they speak to the conditions which
precede the signing of arbitration agreements, these cases go directly to
the issue of consent. Both Connolly and Saturn involve efforts to insure
that parties to an arbitration agreement freely consent to forego judicial
redress, rather than being coerced into such consent as a non-negotiable
condition of doing business. In so doing, these cases focus on what will
probably be the thrust of future parrying between state and federal gov-
ernments over PDAA's. Clearly, PDAA's do bespeak a degree of coer-
cion if they must be signed before an investor can implement a desired
investment strategy. The SEC has acknowledged this fact in urging se-
curities dealers to come up with an acceptable plan for making these
agreements voluntary. The CFTC has also acknowledged the element of
coercion by issuing regulations forbidding coercion in arbitration agree-
ments relating to futures trading. When Massachusetts attempted to ad-
dress this issue in its state-level regulations, however, it was preempted,
118. Id.
119. Id. at 728.
120. Id. at 729.
121. Id. at 731.
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although the intent of the FAA, as explained in Volt, was clearly that
arbitration agreements be consensual.
With both federal and state governments focusing on the issue of in-
formed consent, more state legislation designed to assert local control
over PDAA's can be expected. At present, however, in the wake of Con-
nolly coupled with Saturn, states have no clear guidelines for construct-
ing statutes to provide for arbitration agreements which are both
consensual and legal. Given current case law, states can draw only the
general conclusion that their statutes will be upheld if they support the
federal policy favoring arbitration and treat arbitration contracts simi-
larly to other contracts. Within these parameters, states are free to exert
some control over the details of PDAA's. With the critical issue of how
to insure voluntary consent still unsettled, however, they have virtually
no control over whether such contracts are permitted. Perhaps, if the
Supreme Court had agreed to hear Connolly, the states would have re-
ceived more explicit guidelines for constructing statutes which will sat-
isfy their concern for informed consent without running afoul of the
PDAA. Clearly, this is the direction the states need to effectively dis-
charge their concurrent authority to regulate the securities industry
within their borders.
If the courts do not articulate clearly the manner in which states can
regulate PDAA's to their satisfaction without incurring preemption by
the FAA, the skirmishing between state and federal government will con-
tinue. Perhaps the most effective way to resolve this apparent conflict of
interest is the way suggested by Representative Markey. A state repre-
sentative should articulate the wishes of the people who elect him in his
state by fashioning statutes immune from preemption by the FAA and
allowing other elected state representatives to judge this proposed stat-
ute. That, after all, is how a democratic federation of states is supposed
to operate.
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